Proximal Origin
CIA's new analysis of old evidence concludes with only low confidence COVID-19 leaked from WIV.
Background
“It’s Just The Flu: A comprehensive catalogue of COVID-19 disinformation from ‘trusted authorities,’” February 8, 2022.
“Oversight: GAO finds NIH, EHA failed to monitor subawards to WIV," January 26, 2023.
Timeline of EcoHealth’s Demise
2019
24 JULY—The National Institutes of Health (NIH) renews EcoHealth’s 5-year grant on risks of bat coronaviruses emerging.
2020
17 APRIL—“We will end that grant very quickly,” President Donald Trump says at press conference.
24 APRIL—NIH axes $3.7 million EcoHealth grant.
20 MAY—Seventy-seven Nobel laureates are “alarmed” by NIH’s decision.
2021
30 MARCH—World Health Organization commission report says lab origin is “extremely unlikely.”
6 SEPTEMBER—Gain-of-function concerns flare when The Interceptobtains EcoHealth grants.
20 SEPTEMBER—DRASTIC releases EcoHealth’s Department of Defense grant proposal to introduce furin cleavage sites.
20 OCTOBER—NIH criticizes EcoHealth for “late” grant report.
26 OCTOBER—EcoHealth calls NIH’s assertions “mistakes.”
2023
25 JANUARY—The Department of Health and Human Services’s (HHS’s) Office of Inspector General issues critical audit of EcoHealth and NIH.
MAY—NIH restarts suspended Ecohealth bat virus grant.
19 JULY—HHS moves to debar EcoHealth collaborator, Wuhan Institute of Virology.
2024
1 MAY—Daszak testifies before House of Representatives panel on COVID-19 origins.
15 MAY—HHS suspends all of EcoHealth’s federal grants and proposes debarment.
2025
17 JANUARY—HHS formally debars EcoHealth and Daszak
Recent Developments
On January 25, 2023—the same day the Office of the Inspector General at the U.S. Government Accountability Office released its audit into NIH/NIAID’s funding of EcoHealth Alliance’s (“EHA”) research at the Wuhan Institute of Virology (“WIV”)—Representative Guy Reschenthaler (R., PA) and Senator Jon Ernst (R., IA) introduced identical bills in the House (H.R.494) and Senate (S.84) titled the “Defend EcoHealth Alliance Act.”
The bills were referred to the House Committee on Oversight and Accountability and the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions.
On May 1, 2024, Daszak testified before the House Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Pandemic. Daszak’s testimony is summarized, below.
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I. BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT
Purpose of the Hearing
The Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Pandemic convened to examine EcoHealth Alliance’s role in funding and conducting high-risk research, including so-called “gain-of-function” research, at the Wuhan Institute of Virology in China.
Members on both sides of the aisle sought clarity about EcoHealth’s grant compliance, transparency, and the underlying nature of the experiments conducted.
Key Concerns
EcoHealth’s alleged failure to comply with NIH reporting requirements (e.g., annual progress reports).
Whether EcoHealth funded or conducted gain-of-function research at WIV.
Whether EcoHealth accurately represented or concealed the scope of its collaborations with Chinese entities.
Whether EcoHealth’s work (particularly “Project DEFUSE” proposed to DARPA) was misrepresented in order to secure or attempt to secure funding.
Whether EcoHealth knowingly withheld, delayed, or mischaracterized scientific data and findings from US health officials.
Witness
Dr. Peter Daszak, President, EcoHealth Alliance
EcoHealth is a New York-based nonprofit focused on emerging disease research, often in partnership with international laboratories.
Dr. Daszak had collaborated with the Wuhan Institute of Virology for roughly 15 years before the COVID-19 pandemic.
II. KEY LINES OF QUESTIONING AND RESPONSES
Below is a breakdown of the major topics, the questioners, Dr. Daszak’s responses, and commentary/analysis.
A. Opening Statements
Chairman Brad Wenstrup (R)
Expressed concerns that EcoHealth funded risky research at WIV, failed to report as required, and used narrow definitions to claim it never engaged in “gain of function.”
Noted EcoHealth’s alleged late or missing reporting to NIH.
Cited new revelations that EcoHealth still has thousands of unanalyzed samples in Wuhan freezers.
Emphasized the hearing’s goal: accountability for scientific research that could pose pandemic risks.
Ranking Member Raul Ruiz (D)
Made clear that no conclusive evidence has proven EcoHealth’s research caused COVID-19.
Stated that while EcoHealth’s alleged lack of transparency and inaccurate reporting is concerning, it is distinct from proving the virus originated in the lab.
Urged the Subcommittee to focus on forward-looking solutions for preventing future pandemics.
Chairman Morgan Griffith (R, Energy & Commerce)
Criticized NIH’s and EcoHealth’s oversight failures and “lax” regulation of risky pathogen experiments.
Remarked it was “incomprehensible” that EcoHealth’s grant was ultimately reinstated and that NIAID continued to do business with EcoHealth despite questions regarding the Wuhan lab.
Representative Debbie Dingell (D)
Questioned EcoHealth’s compliance and stated that the hearing should focus on ensuring better future protocols for high-risk research.
Highlighted steps NIAID has already taken to strengthen oversight but insisted further improvements may be needed.
B. DEFUSE Proposal and Downplaying Chinese Involvement
Questioners:
Chairman Wenstrup (R)
Rep. Nicole Malliotakis (R)
Committee Staff
Key Points Raised:
Project DEFUSE to DARPA (2018)
DARPA ultimately rejected EcoHealth’s “DEFUSE” proposal.
Emails revealed that in drafting the proposal, Daszak told collaborators (including Dr. Ralph Baric and Dr. Shi Zhengli) that EcoHealth should “downplay” Chinese involvement in order to make the proposal more appealing to DARPA.
Another email stated the group could highlight the US-based research in order to secure funding first and then possibly shift work to Wuhan.
Biosafety Levels
Draft comments in the DEFUSE proposal indicated WIV might do work at BSL-2, although US scientists like Dr. Baric typically used BSL-3 for such experiments.
Dr. Baric’s email, “US researchers will freak out,” underscores the concern that US norms for coronavirus manipulations are at BSL-3, not BSL-2.
Daszak’s Responses:
Acknowledged the email comments but said they were from an early “draft” that never reflected the final proposal.
Contended he only wanted to “stress the US side” because DARPA might be hesitant to fund foreign labs, not to conceal collaboration with WIV.
Insisted the final proposal (which DARPA rejected) did not have gain-of-function aims done at BSL-2.
Analysis:
The emails strongly suggest EcoHealth strategized to minimize the appearance of heavy Chinese involvement to secure US funds.
Daszak repeatedly insisted the final DEFUSE proposal never funded any actual BSL-2 work at WIV.
This exchange underscores the suspicion that EcoHealth was willing to shape its proposals in ways the funders would accept, raising concerns about transparency and candor.
C. Delayed and Possibly Edited Progress Reports
Questioners:
Rep. Morgan Griffith (R)
Rep. Debbie Dingell (D)
Rep. Deborah Ross (D)
Committee Staff
Key Points Raised:
Year 5 Progress Report (Due September 2019)
EcoHealth submitted it almost two years late (August 2021).
A draft from May 2020 (obtained from a whistleblower) included statements calling bat spillover “rare,” whereas the final version (submitted in 2021) stated that hundreds of thousands to a million people might be infected annually in China and Southeast Asia.
Members alleged an inconsistency or potential “editing” aimed at supporting the narrative that zoonotic spillover was common.
Daszak’s Explanation of the Delay
Claimed EcoHealth was “locked out” of the NIH online system and had made phone calls to NIH that apparently were not answered.
NIH’s forensic check of its system found no evidence of a lockout.
EcoHealth produced no emails from September 2019 specifically complaining about a system lockout.
Questions of Accuracy
Dr. Griffith challenged Daszak for an apparent contradiction: in November 2023, Daszak stated the year 5 draft and final submissions were “in all respects the same,” yet the May 2020 draft shows the “rare event” conclusion. The final 2021 version discusses up to a million spillovers a year.
Daszak’s Responses:
Insisted that the year 5 “rare” wording was revised based on new analyses, though the official final version was submitted two years later.
Claimed EcoHealth tried to submit on time but encountered technical issues, repeated phone calls, and confusion on NIH’s end.
Under questioning, admitted having no documentary proof of these phone calls or lockout attempts but promised to search EcoHealth’s records.
Analysis:
The late submission and the stark change in language about frequency of spillover events were a major focus of skepticism from both Republicans and Democrats.
Dr. Daszak’s inability to produce any email verifying the alleged lockout or phone calls undermined his credibility on this point.
The question remains whether the abrupt pivot from “rare” to “a million infections” per year was motivated by post-pandemic attempts to stress a natural spillover origin.
D. Gain-of-Function Allegations
Questioners:
Rep. Mariannette Miller-Meeks (R)
Rep. Malliotakis (R)
Committee Staff
Key Points Raised:
Definition of Gain-of-Function
NIH’s internal definitions have changed over time, and a separate “P3CO framework” (Potential Pandemic Pathogen Care and Oversight) was introduced.
Despite NIH leaders (Dr. Francis Collins, Dr. Anthony Fauci, and Dr. Lawrence Tabak) confirming that EcoHealth’s experiment “did indeed meet the definition” in common scientific parlance, EcoHealth repeated that it did not meet the strict regulatory definition that triggers additional oversight.
Year 4 Mouse Experiments
During year 4 of the grant, certain chimeric SARS-like viruses showed over a one-log increase in viral growth, a sign of “enhanced viral replication.”
EcoHealth did not immediately report this to NIAID as required if >1 log increase was observed.
Daszak’s Explanation
Maintains that the viruses used were not known to infect humans and thus did not qualify under the official Federal “gain-of-function” ban or P3CO guidelines.
Asserted that NIH thoroughly reviewed the experiments and found them permissible, ultimately giving them the “green light.”
Analysis:
Daszak repeated that NIH told him the experiments did not meet the formal threshold for regulation.
However, multiple members pointed out that NIH staff have since testified the work fit a common-sense definition of gain-of-function, though it did not trigger the formal P3CO threshold.
The repeated back-and-forth on definitions highlighted major confusion in US policy on “gain-of-function.” Critics said EcoHealth took advantage of the ambiguity to dismiss legitimate safety questions.
E. Incomplete Access to Wuhan Institute of Virology Data
Questioners:
Rep. Jill Tokuda (D)
Staff for both Majority and Minority
Rep. John Joyce (R)
Key Points Raised:
Access to Samples vs. Sequences
NIAID officials previously stated that Daszak told them EcoHealth had physical access to the WIV-collected bat samples. That was partly why NIH restored the grant.
Daszak in the hearing insisted EcoHealth does not physically possess these samples, which remain in freezers at WIV.
EcoHealth only has partial or “electronic” access (viral genomic sequences) for further study.
Lab Notebooks
NIH demanded lab notebooks from the Wuhan Institute to verify the experiments.
EcoHealth claimed to have asked once, got no response, and never followed up.
Potential Collaboration with Chinese Military
Some members cited State Department statements that WIV collaborates with the Chinese military.
Daszak denied knowledge of any direct military involvement, argued the lab was strictly a civilian research entity in his experience.
Daszak’s Responses:
Emphasized that the original plan was to get all relevant data from WIV, but once politics became heated, China cut off or limited access.
Claimed it was infeasible to demand more from WIV given the tense geopolitical environment and that NIH told them to cease subaward work with WIV anyway.
Analysis:
Members from both parties found it troubling that key WIV data remain in China and likely inaccessible—highlighting a fundamental flaw in the arrangement of overseas high-risk research with limited US oversight.
Daszak’s reliance on “personal trust” with WIV scientists is at odds with US adversarial relationship with the Chinese government. This underscores the risk in funding labs inside non-transparent regimes.
F. Communications with Dr. David Morens (Senior Adviser to Dr. Fauci)
Questioners:
Rep. Rich McCormick (R)
Rep. Comer (R)
Committee Staff
Key Points Raised:
Use of Personal Gmail
Emails showed Daszak and Morens used private accounts to discuss the suspended EcoHealth grant and strategies for reinstatement.
Dr. Morens allegedly indicated a preference for personal Gmail to avoid FOIA or “public records.”
Possible Undermining of NIAID Decision
Some members implied that Morens’ advice helped EcoHealth navigate the bureaucracy to get the suspended NIH grant reinstated, despite NIH’s official compliance actions.
Daszak’s Response:
Claimed these were personal communications with a longtime colleague, not official instructions.
Denied any wrongdoing or bypassing official channels; argued it was “friend-to-friend” advice.
Analysis:
The revelations that a top adviser to Dr. Fauci privately shared NIH internal deliberations with Daszak raised concern that EcoHealth might have had special access.
Democrats tended to view this as a “personal channel” with no direct effect on official decisions, but Republicans insisted it revealed at least an ethical gray area.
G. EcoHealth’s Ongoing Government Funding and Future Work
Questioners:
Multiple Republicans
Some Democrats
Key Points Raised:
Continuation of Funding
EcoHealth has received millions in new and ongoing funding from Federal agencies (e.g., USAID, DTRA) post-COVID.
Some members argued EcoHealth’s history of compliance issues should disqualify it from further Federal support.
Future Risky Research
EcoHealth apparently continues or plans to do high-risk research with Nipah and Ebola viruses at labs in other countries.
Skeptics worry about a repeat scenario of incomplete oversight or questionable foreign partners.
Daszak’s Defense
Emphasized EcoHealth’s “pandemic-prevention” focus, citing a track record of identifying emerging threats.
Argued that halting EcoHealth’s global collaborations would harm US national security by reducing data on future outbreaks.
Analysis:
Sharp disagreement over whether EcoHealth should receive further funding.
Supporters say EcoHealth’s mission of analyzing wild virus reservoirs is valuable, especially for prevention.
Critics say EcoHealth’s track record of lax compliance, questionable subaward oversight, and questionable candor is too risky to continue awarding them taxpayer dollars.
III. BROADER ANALYSIS
Credibility and Transparency Issues
Dr. Daszak’s repeated claims of “no evidence” for certain allegations clashed with partial, circumstantial, or contradictory information.
The hearing spotlighted confusion over the year 5 progress report, the absence of documented proof of EcoHealth’s attempts to submit it on time, and shifting language on the frequency of zoonotic spillovers. These discrepancies undermined trust in EcoHealth’s official statements.
Gain-of-Function Ambiguity
A recurring theme was the mismatch between narrow Federal definitions (which EcoHealth cites to say the research “did not qualify”) vs. the common scientific usage and the plain meaning behind creating enhanced viruses in mice.
Daszak repeatedly deferred to NIH’s official stance that the work was not “gain-of-function” under the regulations. However, some Subcommittee members and even NIH staff have acknowledged those viruses did in fact display “enhanced” pathogenic traits in mice.
Chinese Partners and Missing Data
Major concerns remain about reliance on cooperation from WIV, whose data and samples are effectively sealed off by the Chinese government.
Daszak’s trust that Chinese scientists always provide him honest data stands at odds with US intelligence and State Department statements about the Wuhan Institute’s ties to China’s military.
Implications for Future Federal Funding
Multiple Republicans explicitly declared EcoHealth should never receive Federal funding again.
Several Democrats criticized EcoHealth’s lapses but stopped short of advocating a funding ban, saying the group’s research mission remains important for pandemic preparedness.
Partisan vs. Bipartisan Elements
There was unusual bipartisanship in concerns about EcoHealth’s lack of timely reporting and minimal effort to get missing data from WIV.
Where partisan lines emerged most was the question of whether EcoHealth’s conduct definitively implicates the lab in COVID’s origin vs. whether the root cause remains inconclusive.
IV. CONCLUSION
The hearing highlighted fundamental tensions over how best to oversee risky virus research, particularly when performed through foreign collaborations in countries like China. Both parties largely agreed that EcoHealth Alliance under Dr. Daszak repeatedly failed to meet timely reporting obligations, was overly reliant on personal trust in WIV’s candor, and offered shifting rationales regarding gain-of-function definitions.
In sum, the questioning painted a picture of an organization that, at best, has been disorganized and prone to minor evasions, and at worst, has been systematically concealing or downplaying the extent of its work in Wuhan to protect its grants and reputation. The hearing left open the question of what ultimately caused COVID-19, as no conclusive evidence was presented to prove EcoHealth’s direct role in creating SARS-CoV-2. Yet it raised serious concerns about whether EcoHealth should retain Federal funding privileges and whether far stricter biosafety and accountability measures are needed for future pandemic-prevention research.
Forward-Looking Takeaway:
Lawmakers on both sides indicated that legislative reforms to clarify “gain-of-function” oversight, better define terms, and require verifiable compliance will likely be forthcoming.
Enhanced transparency requirements for international subawards, plus more robust auditing, could reduce the risk of repeating the lapses exposed in this hearing.
The hearing also underscores the difficulty of collaborating with institutions in authoritarian or secretive jurisdictions if critical data can be withheld or destroyed.
Overall, the hearing revealed EcoHealth’s organizational and compliance shortcomings while simultaneously underscoring the importance of genuine and enforceable safeguards around high-risk pathogen research.
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On January 17, 2025, following his bipartisan grilling by the Select Subcommittee, HHS formally debarred Daszak and EcoHealth for five (5) years from government procurement and nonprocurement programs to protect the U.S.’s business interests.
Yesterday, January 25, 2025, Julian Barnes of The New York Times published an article detailing the CIA’s purportedly ‘new’ analysis that concludes with low confidence COVID-19 leaked from WIV and does not have a zoonotic origin.
Summary of Barnes’ Article
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Julian E. Barnes is an American journalist who covers national security and the intelligence community for The New York Times. He joined The Times in 2018 after covering defense and security issues for The Wall Street Journal for many years. Barnes is based in Washington, D.C., and his reporting frequently focuses on topics such as U.S. intelligence assessments, cybersecurity, and global security challenges.
I. ARTICLE OVERVIEW
Headline & Main Point
The article reports that the C.I.A. has issued a new assessment favoring the theory that COVID-19 originated from an accidental leak at a Wuhan research lab, rather than from natural animal-to-human transmission at a Wuhan wet market. This is a shift from the agency’s longstanding view that there was insufficient information to reach a conclusion.Catalyst for the New Assessment
The piece says the shift did not arise from fresh intelligence; rather, it stems from reanalysis of existing evidence, especially conditions and safety protocols in the high-security labs in Wuhan.
John Ratcliffe, presented here as the new director of the C.I.A., publicly stated he wants the agency “off the sidelines” in the debate over COVID origins—implying a more definitive stance is needed.
Context: Previous Intelligence Community Positions
Under previous leadership, the intelligence community had been split: some agencies leaned toward natural spillover (zoonotic theory), others—like the F.B.I. and Department of Energy—favored a lab leak. The C.I.A. until now had remained inconclusive.
The new C.I.A. assessment is said to carry “low confidence,” meaning that the intelligence behind it is incomplete or fragmentary.
Political and Institutional Dynamics
The article suggests that Ratcliffe, who previously served as Director of National Intelligence in the first Trump administration, has long favored the lab leak hypothesis.
The piece references tensions about whether intelligence agencies avoided endorsing the lab leak scenario under the Biden administration to steer clear of geopolitical conflicts with China.
Former officials are quoted as saying the question of COVID’s origin (natural vs. lab) bears significant weight for U.S.-China relations.
Continuing Uncertainty
Despite the C.I.A.’s shift, the article emphasizes that no conclusive “smoking gun” exists: no direct evidence of a zoonotic intermediary animal has been found, nor has any lab-based “progenitor virus” definitively been identified.
Intelligence officials note that if such evidence exists, it is likely hidden or unknown, and that the Chinese government is either unwilling or unable to provide clarity.
Implications
Ratcliffe vows a more aggressive push to obtain conclusive intelligence, possibly via new operations targeting the labs in Wuhan or the broader Chinese government.
Nonetheless, officials concede the best clues may ultimately come from scientific rather than purely intelligence-based breakthroughs.
II. MAJOR THEMES AND POINTS OF DEBATE
Agency Credibility vs. Political Pressure
A key tension in the article is whether the C.I.A. is genuinely altering its stance based on thorough reanalysis or bowing to external/political pressure.
Officials quoted insist the change was a “long time coming” and that the agency is not simply bending to Ratcliffe’s personal convictions.
Low-Confidence Assessment
The assessment’s “low confidence” label means the conclusion is tentative. Critics question the wisdom of shifting the agency’s official stance without new, decisive data.
Advocates say “low confidence” still conveys a leaning and encourages deeper intelligence efforts.
Challenges of Finding Conclusive Proof
Whether the pandemic started naturally or leaked from a lab, U.S. intelligence lacks direct evidence.
The Chinese government’s opacity—or even internal ignorance—means the intelligence community may never obtain a clear “eureka” moment.
Scientists likewise have not identified the bat or intermediate animal that would confirm zoonotic transfer, nor a definitive lab-based “ancestor virus.”
Impact on U.S.-China Relations
The article frames the lab leak conclusion as having significant geopolitical implications, given that it implies a deadly pandemic may have arisen from Chinese government or military-affiliated research.
Ratcliffe, who publicly endorses the lab leak hypothesis, sees revealing the lab origin as important leverage or a crucial factor in shaping future relations with China.
Continued Division Among Agencies
The article highlights how different agencies have landed on different sides of the debate:
FBI: Lab leak is likely from Wuhan Institute of Virology.
Department of Energy: Also a leak, but possibly from the Wuhan Center for Disease Control.
Many others (NIA, DIA, etc.) lean toward a natural spillover with similarly low confidence.
Now the C.I.A. becomes an additional voice favoring the lab hypothesis.
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Although the details of the CIA’s ‘new’ analysis are obviously not public, the core message of the Barnes’s article is the same exact core message Ranking Member Raul Ruiz espoused in his opening statement at Daszak’s hearing: it is still debatable and reasonable minds can differ whether COVID-19 has a proximate origin in WIV or in nature, due to a lack of conclusive evidence for the lab leak theory.
The analysis, however, is based in part on a closer look at the conditions in the high security labs in Wuhan province before the pandemic outbreak, according to people familiar with the agency’s work.
Since the outbreak of the pandemic, questions have swirled around whether the two labs handling coronaviruses in Wuhan had followed safety protocols strictly enough.
These [senior] officials [in the Biden administration who defend their process and methodology that concluded with low confidence COVID-19 was of zoonotic origin] say that there are powerful logical arguments for both the lab leak and the natural causes theories, but that there simply is no decisive piece of intelligence on either side of the issue.
To boost the natural origins theory, intelligence officers would like to find the animal that passed it to a human or find a bat carrying what was the likely ancestor of the coronavirus that causes Covid.
Similarly, to seal the lab leak, the intelligence community would like to find evidence that one of the labs in Wuhan was working on a progenitor virus that directly led to the epidemic.
These officials say that there are powerful logical arguments for both the lab leak and the natural causes theories, but that there simply is no decisive piece of intelligence on either side of the issue.
Neither piece of evidence has been found.
It will not be an easy secret to steal. The senior ranks of the Chinese government do not know, and do not want to know, American officials have said. So if there is intelligence, it is probably hidden in a place that is hard to get to.
Intelligence officials interviewed in recent weeks say it is possible that such a piece of evidence exists in a lab in China, at least in theory. But, they said, it is still more likely that the answers to questions surrounding the virus’s origins will come through a scientific breakthrough, not an intelligence revelation.
(Emphases added.)
As shown above, the CIA officials who continue to defend the possibility of a natural origin give the following reasons for their reluctance to reach a conclusion:
Zoonotic origin hypothesis: researchers have yet to find “the animal that passed it to a human or find a bat carrying what was the likely ancestor of the coronavirus that causes Covid.”
Lab origin hypothesis: the intelligence community has yet to find “evidence that one of the labs in Wuhan was working on a progenitor virus that directly led to the epidemic.”
Barnes repeats the unnamed senior CIA officials’ argument that there is no decisive evidence to prove either hypothesis; viz., that there is no smoking gun. Barnes writes “neither piece of evidence has been found,” which statement assumes the fact there is such evidence to prove or disprove either theory. Barnes explains the lack of proof for the lab leak theory (“evidence that one of the labs in Wuhan was working on a progenitor virus that directly led to the epidemic”), saying that, “if there is [such] intelligence, it is probably hidden in a place that is hard to get to.” Barnes observes “it is possible that such a piece of evidence exists in a lab in China, at least in theory.” Finally, Barnes states the Biden administration CIA officials’ conclusions that “the answers to questions surrounding the virus’s origins will come through a scientific breakthrough, not an intelligence revelation.
Further, in reference to evidence of a progenitor virus at a Chinese lab, Barnes links his article of August 21, 2021.
In the 2021 article, Barnes wrote:
American intelligence agencies have not been able to determine if the coronavirus pandemic was the result of an accidental leak from a lab or if it emerged more naturally, according to declassified portions of a report to the White House that were released on Friday.
The nation’s spy agencies, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence said, are unlikely to reach a conclusion without more cooperation from China or new sources of information.
“We will do everything we can to trace the roots of this outbreak that has caused so much pain and death around the world, so that we can take every necessary precaution to prevent it from happening again,” Mr. Biden said. “Critical information about the origins of this pandemic exists in the People’s Republic of China, yet from the beginning, government officials in China have worked to prevent international investigators and members of the global public health community from accessing it.”
After the review, the National Intelligence Council and four other intelligence agencies reported that they believed the virus that causes Covid-19 was most likely created by “natural exposure to an infected animal through an animal infected with it, or close progenitor virus.”
Before the review was conducted, only two agencies favored the natural exposure theory. But the new report said the intelligence council and other agencies favoring the natural theory had only low confidence in their conclusions — a sign that the intelligence behind the determination was not strong and that assessments could change.
On the other side of the debate, one agency said it had concluded, with moderate confidence, that the pandemic was the result of “a laboratory-associated incident” in China. According to the declassified report, analysts at that agency gave weight to the risky nature of work on coronaviruses. The agency also said the accident most likely involved “experimentation, animal handling or sampling by the Wuhan Institute of Virology.”
There were two labs in Wuhan doing work on the coronavirus before the pandemic, but intelligence agencies have mostly focused on the work done at the Wuhan Institute of Virology.
The announcement from the director of national intelligence did not identify the agency that favored the laboratory-leak theory. But current and former officials said the F.B.I. believed that the virus was created in the lab. One former official said the bureau believed the virus probably escaped into the public from lab technicians.
Critical to the debate over the origins of the virus, American intelligence officials do not believe the Chinese officials knew about it at the time of the outbreak, the report said.
“The I.C. assesses China’s officials did not have foreknowledge of the virus before the initial outbreak of Covid-19 emerged,” the declassified report said, using the initials for the intelligence community.
The key piece of missing data, according to intelligence officials, is clinical virus samples from early cases in China.
Neither American intelligence officers, nor scientists around the world, have samples of the virus from the earliest known cases. That includes samples from a group of three Wuhan laboratory workers who became hospitalized with flulike symptoms last January.
Obtaining virus samples from early cases in China could help identify “a location of interest” or “occupational exposure,” the declassified report said.
Some American officials believe China has more access to such samples than it has been willing to share. The reluctance to cooperate has raised suspicions among some analysts.
The investigation of the theory that the virus was accidentally created in the lab has made some people uneasy, especially those who believe the accusation is racist.
Sonal Shah, the president of the Asian American Foundation, warned against allowing the examination of the origins of the pandemic to increase the risk of violence against Asian Americans and Pacific Islanders.
“Even though the administration’s report today contains no clear conclusions, it will likely breed misinformation,” she said.
Others have defended the examination and said that neither theory is inherently racist. They have argued that a clearer understanding of the pandemic’s origins can help prevent a future global health crisis.
(Emphases added.)
There are notable changes between the intelligence community’s reported avenues for further inquiry between Barnes’ 2021 article and yesterday’s article:
In 2021, the IC believed COVID-19 was created by “natural exposure to an infected animal through an animal infected with it, or close progenitor virus.”
The use of the word “natural” unnecessarily implies exposure to the virus in a non-lab environment, when there is no reason why the exposure to the infected animal could have happened in a lab context.
EcoHealth is known to have funded the creation of artificially enhanced novel coronavirus chimeras in mice at WIV. As previously reported by Law and Politics in “Oversight”:
The audit focused on an EHA research proposal called “Understanding the Risk of Bat Coronavirus Emergence” (Federal Award Identification Number R01AI110964). NIAID program officers tasked with reviewing EHA’s research proposal initially thought the experiments “appear to involve research covered under the [2016] pause [on gain-of-function research implemented by the Obama administration].” Despite these initial concerns, NIAID approved funding for the research, after Dr. Peter Daszak, President of EHA, promised to stop EHA’s experiments and inform NIAID in the event a novel SARS chimera showed evidence of enhanced viral growth greater than 1 log (10 times) over the original viruses. In 2018, one of EHA’s experiments resulted in a novel SARS chimera with 4 log (10,000 times) greater growth than the parent virus.
(Emphasis added.)
As previously reported by Katherine Eban of Vanity Fair in “Ralph Baric, Whose Virology Techniques Were Used in Wuhan, Testified That Lab Leak Was Possible,” Dr. Ralph S. Baric, the leading gain-of-function researcher globally who was involved in analyzing the chimeras produced at WIV under EcoHealth grants, repeatedly noted his concerns to Daszak regarding WIV doing dangerous research in biosafety level three (“BSL-2”) conditions instead of biosafety level (“BSL-3”) conditions (that include negative pressure air flow to protect against leaks):
The single biggest issue to jump from the pages of Baric’s testimony is his persistent concern over unsafe research practices at the WIV. Some of Shi’s research papers, he said, “actually stated that they were doing the culturing work under BSL-2.” BSL-3 labs typically require negative pressure air flow, HEPA air filtration systems, and full Tyvek suits for lab workers—all to protect against leaks. BSL-2 laboratories do not require specialized air filtration or full gowns.
As Baric recounted to congressional investigators, Shi’s earlier work was “very vague about safety conditions. They said they followed Chinese regulations.” But in two subsequent papers, said Baric, “They actually stated that they were doing the culturing work under BSL-2…. And then they continued that even into September of 2020, which I thought was irresponsible.” (Neither Shi Zhengli nor a spokesperson for the Wuhan Institute of Virology responded to requests for comment.)
Baric told the committee that, from his earliest days working with zoonotic coronaviruses, he always understood there was a real if “rare” chance that one could prove infectious to humans. “And if that’s your hypothesis, then you do it under BSL-3,” he said. “So I kind of set the standard in the United States.”
But the WIV, he said, operated under a looser set of biosafety protocols. “Their regulations state pretty clearly that they don’t consider culturing bat viruses at BSL-2 as a biosafety concern,” he said. “I also had that verbally confirmed by Zhengli Shi at a meeting in Harbin, when I was telling her she should move it all to BSL-3 and the reasons why.” (Less than a year into the pandemic, the Chinese government passed legislation that tightened the nation’s laboratory safety practices.)
The dispute over biosafety arose again in 2018, as Baric and Shi worked with Daszak on a grant proposal to collect SARS-like bat coronaviruses and insert a genetic component called a furin cleavage site that would enable them to more easily infect human cells. The proposal has since drawn attention because, when SARS-CoV-2 subsequently emerged in Wuhan, it possessed a furin cleavage site, making it unique among SARS-related coronaviruses. The 2018 proposal was submitted by Daszak to the Pentagon research and development agency DARPA.
The early draft stipulated that the research would be done at a BSL-2 level, making it “highly cost-effective.” Baric objected to this in a margin comment of his own: “IN the US, these recombinant SARS CoV are studied under BSL3, not BSL2, especially important for those that are able to bind and replicate in primary human cells. In china, might be growin these virus under bsl2. US researchers will likely freak out.” In the finished proposal, BSL-2 was changed to BSL-3.
Baric told congressional investigators that he wrote the margin comment to Daszak “to make sure he pays attention.” He added, “First, I’m informing him, just in case he doesn’t know, that a lot of the virus discovery work and culturing work that the Chinese do with zoonotic coronaviruses is done at BSL-2…. I’m letting him know there’s a difference.”
After a congressional investigator observed, “It appears there may have been a willingness, not necessarily by you, to do some of this work in the BSL-2 in China,” Baric responded, “There was no willingness on my part to do any of this work…. Let me make that clear.” He subsequently clarified, “My role was to study a couple of the viruses that the Wuhan Institute of Virology found that they were willing to share with me.”
DARPA rejected the grant, but questions have persisted over whether WIV scientists carried out the proposed research anyway. Baric told congressional investigators that he doesn’t know whether the WIV continued the research or got other funding for it.
Baric’s signing of that letter also precipitated a testy email exchange with Daszak over the WIV’s safety standards, obtained by Vanity Fair. Daszak enumerated to Baric the various ways in which China’s lab safety standards did not lag far behind US standards. He added, “We checked with Zhengli, who let us know that she used ‘BSL-2 with negative pressure and appropriate PPE.’”
This brought a withering response from Baric. “Bsl2 with negative pressure, give me a break.” He pointed out that even Shi’s most recent papers never defined the safety precautions used. “Yes china has the right to set their own policy. You believe this was appropriate containment if you want but don’t expect me to believe it. Moreover, don’t insult my intelligence by trying to feed me this load of BS.”
Reached for comment, Daszak told Vanity Fair that the WIV performed its animal infection experiments “at BSL-3, as per work at Dr. Baric’s lab in the USA.”
(Emphases added.)
In 2025, the IC believes COVID-19 more likely than not leaked from WIV.
In 2021, “American intelligence officials [did] not believe the Chinese officials knew about it at the time of the outbreak.”
As previously reported by Law and Politics in “It’s Just the Flu,” there is strong circumstantial evidence Chinese officials new a novel coronavirus leaked from WIV and acted to cover-up that fact:
The WIV had published an important database of virus genetic sequences. However, in September 2019 they removed this database with the excuse that it was subject to cypher attacks, and they have not made it available to any researchers. This makes it impossible to determine the exact path of the development of SARS-COV-2.
According to The Lancet, doctors in Wuhan treated a person for COVID-19 on December 1, 2019. Five days later, on December 6, the patient’s wife contracted symptoms despite having no known contact with the wet market. Doctors in Wuhan therefore became aware of an unknown virus with human-to-human transmission in the first week of December.
On December 21, Wuhan doctors noticed a “cluster of pneumonia cases with an unknown cause.”
On December 25, medical staff in two Wuhan hospitals contracted viral pneumonia and quarantined, adding to the evidence for human-to-human transmission.
On December 30, whistleblower Dr. Li Wenliang sent a message to other doctors warning there was a possible outbreak of an unknown virus resembling SARS.
On December 31, the Wuhan Municipal Health Commission declared, “The investigation so far has not found any obvious human-to-human transmission and no medical staff infection,” despite the evidence to the contrary.
The same day, the CCP alerted WHO to a possible endemic, three weeks after doctors first started noticing cases of a novel coronavirus.
The same day, Taiwan notified WHO directly they had found evidence of human-to-human transmission.
On January 1, 2020, the Wuhan Public Security Bureau accused Dr. Li Wenliang of “spreading rumors.” Police held Dr. Wenliang for two days and coerced him to sign a statement of criminal guilt. The CCP arrested seven other persons in connection with Wenliang but their fate remains unknown.
The same day, an official at the Hubei Provincial Health Commission ordered genomics companies in China to stop processing tests of the novel virus and to destroy all samples.
The same day, 175,000 people left Wuhan, according to a New York Times analysis of cellphone data.
On January 2, another study in The Lancet found 14 out of 41 infected persons had no exposure to the wet market. The study concluded there was human-to-human transmission. The scientists warned, “We are concerned that 2019-nCoV could have acquired the ability for efficient human transmission.”
The same day, the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV) mapped the genome of the novel coronavirus. China did not inform the world of the novel virus’s genetic sequence for another week.
On January 3, “China’s National Health Commission, the nation’s top health authority, orderedinstitutions not to publish any information related to the unknown disease, and ordered labs to transfer any samples they had to designated testing institutions, or to destroy them.”
The same day, the CCP notified the United States for the first time there was a novel virus, more than a month after first detecting it in Wuhan.
The same day, the CCP again denied the existence of human-to-human transmission, despite the mounting evidence to the contrary. The Wuhan Municipal Health Commission continued to claim, “As of now, preliminary investigations have shown no clear evidence of human-to-human transmission and no medical staff infections.”
On January 4, Dr. Ho Pak-leung of the University of Hong Kong’s Centre for Infection warned, “The city should implement the strictest possible monitoring system for a mystery new viral pneumonia that has infected dozens of people on the mainland, as it is highly possible that the illness is spreading from human to human.”
On January 5, The Wuhan Municipal Health Commission repeated the false claim, “Preliminary investigations have shown no clear evidence of human-to-human transmission and no medical staff infections.”
On January 8, Chinese government authorities announced they had identified the virus. They claimed, and Western media continued to repeat, “There is no evidence that the new virus is readily spread by humans, which would make it particularly dangerous, and it has not been tied to any deaths.”
In 2021, the minority position in the IC was that COVID-19 was most likely caused by “experimentation, animal handling or sampling by the Wuhan Institute of Virology.” The FBI believed the virus “probably escaped into the public from lab technicians.”
In 2025, the minority IC position is that the virus has a natural origin because there is no “evidence that one of the labs in Wuhan was working on a progenitor virus that directly led to the epidemic.”
First, Barnes’ article yesterday obscures the key fact that evidence to disprove the lab leak hypothesis (“a progenitor virus that directly led to the epidemic”) was likely deleted by Chinese authorities from WIV's public database in September 2019, months before the confirmed outbreak at the wet market later in December that year. It is intelligence of this evidence, if it still exists, that Barnes says CIA officials reportedly need to establish the leak came from a lab. But such evidence has probably been destroyed and any intelligence that persists as to its existence is only in the minds of senior Chinese officials.
Second, relatedly, notably absent from Barnes’ article is any explanation or speculation for why the evidence to disprove the zoonotic origin hypothesis has not been discovered. The article’s facade presents ‘both sides’ of the argument, but the thrust is a simple message: evidence or intelligence confirming a lab leak is not forthcoming, because it may not exist or is otherwise hard to discover. Barnes gives no reason for the failure of the last five (5) years to discover what animal passed the virus to humans, notwithstanding thousands of well-funded researchers have been investigating for half a decade.
Third, it is notable Barnes’ 2021 article gratuitously framed the lab leak hypothesis as allegedly racist, potentially pointing to the author’s and/or sources’ potential bias against the lab leak hypothesis.
Fourth, the article in effect presents the CIA’s new message, if not its new analysis, that conclusive proof is needed one way or the other to reach a conclusion with anything more than low confidence. This makes no sense at a fundamental level: science is the realm of proofs; the purpose of intelligence is to diminish and decipher uncertainties where there is no proof.
In this way, the article is misleading and creates an expectation in readers that the evidence needed to corroborate the lab leak hypothesis is beyond the reach of U.S. intelligence. But the evidence necessary to reach a stronger conclusion about COVID-19’s origins is already publicly available.
Summary of Available Evidence
MAY 27, 2014—the NIH/NIAID awarded $3,086,735 to EcoHealth for a five-year project called “Understanding the Risk of Bat Coronavirus Emergence” (Federal Award Identification Number R01AI110964).
The total budget was divided: $838,540 in salaries; $639,966 in administrative costs; $270,840 in “fringe benefits”; $179,590 in travel costs; $53,800 in “other costs”; $749,976 to WIV as a subcontractor; and $295,623 to East China Normal University as a subcontractor.
EcoHealth’s working relationship with researchers in China dates back to around 2009. China is home to bat populations from which a naturally novel coronavirus could emerge.
OCTOBER 17, 2014—the Obama administration makes a surprise announcement initiating a moratorium on gain-of-function research in the United States, in effect halting all federal funding for so-called gain-of-function (“GoF”) studies that alter a pathogen to make it more transmissible or deadly.
(Source.) The pause covered all new GoF research that “reasonably may be anticipated to confer attributes to influenza, MERS, or SARS viruses such that the resulting virus has enhanced pathogenicity and/or transmissibility (via the respiratory route) in mammals.” In other words, the moratorium covered all SARS-related GoF research that reasonably might result in the leak of an enhanced virus capable of infecting humans.
The pause did not apply to “currently-funded research,” such as EcoHealth’s R01AI110964 grant, although the Obama administration asked those programs to adopt a “voluntary pause.”
The NIH continued to accept new applications for GoF function research, including those covered by the “enhanced pathogenicity and/or transmissibility (via the respiratory route) in mammals” criteria. But NIH would not “provide any new or continuation funding for research subject to the pause while the funding pause is in effect.” Federal funding for multi-year research grants is awarded on a year-by-year basis, so no new tranches of federal funds would be dispersed during the moratorium.
Research programs covered by the pause could apply for an exception “granted by the head of a federal funding agency, if that official determines that the research is urgently necessary to protect public health or national security.”
January 4, 2015—WIV opens as the first Biosafety Level 4 (“BSL-4”) laboratory in China.
According to a report in Nature, “A laboratory in Wuhan is on the cusp of being cleared to work with the world’s most dangerous pathogens.” The laboratory was developed in coordination with France and the “[m]any staff from the Wuhan lab have been training at a BSL-4 lab in Lyon.”
According to a report by the U.S. Embassy in Paris, the French government's International Center for Research in Infectious Diseases (CIRI) in Lyon collaborated with WIV to create the $44 million facility. CIRI provided conceptual, engineering and logistical support for the construction of the first BSL-4 laboratory at the WIV, which was commissioned in 2018.MAY 12, 2016—EcoHealth submits its year-two progress report to NIH—as reported by The Intercept:
[EcoHealth] described to NIH its plans to carry out two planned experiments infecting humanized mice with hybrid viruses, known as “chimeras.”
The plans triggered concerns at NIH. Two staff members — Jenny Greer, a grants management specialist, and Erik Stemmy, a program officer handling coronavirus research — wrote to EcoHealth Alliance to say that the experiments “appear to involve research covered under the pause,” referring to a temporary moratorium on funding for gain-of-function research that would be reasonably anticipated to make MERS and SARS viruses more pathogenic or transmissible in mammals.
Initially, NIH staff appeared intent on enforcing the funding pause. The two administrators requested additional information from EcoHealth Alliance within 15 days and noted that the next round of funding would be withheld until the information was received. They also asked the group to provide a detailed description of changes that would allow the researchers to pursue their aims without conducting the dangerous experiments.
MAY 13, 2016—Daszak writes to Erik Stemmy, NIAID Branch Deputy Chief of Bacterial Respiratory Diseases, giving the highlights in EcoHealth’s year-two report. Daszak writes:
In the report, I highlight the reduced amount of wildlife in the local markets within Southern China compared to what we’ve seen before, as well as the continued expansion of the Chinese wildlife trade within SE Asia so that it is now a large-scale international activity. It means the SL-CoVs we find in the wildlife trade would likely have an origin in adjacent countries. Given that our collaborators and field team in China have great contacts in these countries, and EHA also has field teams in many of them, we would like to conduct short filed trips to assess markets, identify wildlife in them, and sample species of bats and other high-risk hosts in countries that neighbor China (Myanmar, Vietnam, Cambodia, Lao PDR) and others that supply wildlife to the international trade to China (Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia).
Daszak also sought fight to highlight that “earlier this year, we hired another senior researcher Noam Ross to conduct data analysis and spatial mapping.” Ross has a background in “zoonotic emergence” and “machine learning.” (EcoHealth would later go on to predict using machine learning to model natural viral emergence in May 2018 as part of their bid for Project DEFUSE.)
JUNE 8, 2016—Daszak responds to NIH concerns—as reported by The Intercept:
Daszak responded to the NIH on June 8, 2016, arguing that, because EcoHealth Alliance’s proposed hybrid viruses were significantly different from the SARS virus, which was already known to infect humans, the experiments were not gain-of-function research and should not be restricted.
Daszak also pointed out that WIV1, the parent of the proposed chimeric SARS-like viruses, “has never been demonstrated to infect humans or cause human disease,” according to the transcribed emails. And he said that previous research “strongly suggests that the chimeric bat spike/bat backbone viruses should not have enhanced pathogenicity in animals.” The NIH would go on to accept these arguments.
But the group’s argument that its viral research did not pose a risk of infection appears to contradict the justification for the work: that these pathogens could potentially cause a pandemic. “The entire rationale of EcoHealth’s grant renewal on SARS-related CoVs is that viruses with spikes substantially (10-25%) diverged from SARS-CoV-1 pose a pandemic risk,” said Bloom. “Given that this is the entire rationale for the work, how can they simultaneously argue these viruses should not be regulated as potential pandemic pathogens?”
(Emphasis added)
JULY 7, 2016—NIH writes to EcoHealth stating, “NIAID is in agreement that the work proposed . . . is not subject to the GoF research funding pause.”
AUGUST 8-11, 2016—researchers meet at the Rockefeller Foundation’s Bellagio Initiative and resolve to create the Global Virome Project (“GVP”). The attendees included Dazsak; Dennis Carroll (then USAID Director of the Pandemic Influenza and other Emerging Threats Unit, now Chair of the GVP Leadership Board); Michael E. Kurilla (then NIAID Director of the Office of Biodefense Research Resources and Translational Research, now Director of Clinical Innovation at NCATS)l and Gao “George” Fu (then Deputy Director of the Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention, then Director of the same, retired in 2022).
SEPTEMBER 28, 2017—the U.S. Embassy in Beijing sends a sensitive but unclassified report titled, “China’s Interest in the Global Virome Project Presents an Opportunity for Global Health Cooperation.” The report stated in part:
The Chinese government has shown strong interest in the Global Virome Project and is not shy about expressing interest in funding projects where Chinese scientists will take a lead. The new Director of China Center for Disease Control and Prevention (China CDC), Dr. George Gao, a distinguished virologist, told Emboff that the Global Virome Project is a priority project that China CDC must push hard on to get stakeholders involved and organize funding. He stated that China's involvement in this project is a good follow-up to the August 21 World Health Organization dialogue meeting at which Health and Human Services Secretary Price and US Ambassador Branstad where both sides agreed on the need for increased U.S. China collaboration against growing health threats at the intersection of animal and human health. In February 2017, Gao led a symposium proposing a China virome project, however the specific details of how the two will integrate was left undefined.
The Beijing Genomics Institute (BGI), now based in Shenzhen, made a blanket offer to conduct 30% of the sequencing for GYP, but did not provide details on how that sequencing would take place or where the subsequent data would be housed. Its current leader, Yang Huanming, was instrumental in China's involvement in the Human Genome Project in the 1990s, and is a proponent of sharing data. BGI's commitment (as opposed to Yang's commitment) to GVP's values of open, free access to data has not yet been officially stated however. [Note: The BGI group has enjoyed significant funding from the Chinese government. BGI Genomics became a publically-traded company in July 2017.]
The GYP expects to raise its $1 billion ten-year budget from a variety of sources, both public and private. Roughly $5 million per year will cover operations of the nongovernmental organization, to include working groups, sample and data standardization and management, and technical assistance to participating country field operations. However, specifics on funding commitments have not been publicly announced.
Beyond creating the database of viral sequences which carries the $1 billion price tag, GVP recognizes the importance of research on the mechanisms and ecology of infectious disease transmission. This type of research already enjoys strong support in both China and the United States, and scientists are increasingly collaborating with each other.
Shi Zhengli, a senior scientist at the Wuhan Institute of Virology, Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) who studied mechanisms of transmission of SARS between species, stated that CAS has already allocated funding for GYP-related research. Wang Zhengwu, Department of International Affairs at CAS, stated that CAS is working on a process and mechanism to support Chinese scientists with backing from the Ministry of Sciences and Technology and The National Natural Science Foundation of China (NSFC) for Global Virome Project type research. He noted that CAS encourages Chinese scientists to take part in or lead international research projects and that CAS has a budget for seed funding to incubate research projects, workshops, and collaboration that can be used for the Global Virome Project Significant USG support for GVP-related research already exists, including the Ecology and Evolution of Infectious Diseases (EEID) program, which is jointly supported by NIH, USDA, and NSF, is actively seeking collaboration in China, and plans to host a joint workshop supported by NSFC and CAS in early 2017.
It is encouraging that China, along with other countries, is ready to take what started as a U.S.-led initiative and proof of concept to a global scale. The GVP still awaits a commitment of funding for its viral sampling and processing infrastructure. It is likely that the Chinese government will engage both with funding and with in-kind support, which will likely give China a large voice in GVP governance and data-sharing policies.(Emphases added.)
NOVEMBER 30, 2017—WIV researchers publish a paper titled, “Discovery of a rich gene pool of bat SARS-related coronaviruses provides new insights into the origin of SARS coronavirus.”
The researchers found that a sample of horseshoe bats from a single cave in Yunnan Province had SARS-like coronaviruses containing all the building blocks of a pandemic SARS-coronavirus genome that caused the human outbreak in 2002-2003. The results suggest that SARS originated from this specific bat population.
More importantly, researchers also showed that various SARS-like coronaviruses can interact with human ACE2 receptors, strongly suggesting that bat SARS-like coronaviruses can be transmitted to humans.DECEMBER 19, 2017—HHS releases the P3CO framework and NIH lifts the Obama administration’s moratorium on gain-of-function research.
The P3CO framework defines a “potential pandemic pathogen” a naturally occurring virus that is highly likely to spread quickly and uncontrollably amongst humans, and which is highly likely to kill a significant number of humans. An “enhanced potential pandemic pathogen” (“ePPP”) is a virus modified by humans in a lab to have enhanced transmissibility, which definition excludes, both, naturally occurring viruses and viruses recovered from nature that are not enhanced.
The framework excludes “surveillance activities, including sampling and sequencing” and “activities associated with developing and producing vaccines, such as generation of high growth strains” from the definition of ePPPs.JANUARY 30, 2018—the Global Virome Project launches at the Prince Mahidol Awards Conference in Thailand with Dennis Carroll as the Chair of the GVP and Daszak as the Treasurer and Secretary of the GVP.
Carroll designed and led Project PREDICT, yet another pandemic research and forecasting project, which received more than $210 million in funding from the U.S. Agency for International Development between 2009 and 2019. PREDICT had sampled 56,000 wild animals and discovered 1,000 new viruses as of September 2017.According to Carroll, PREDICT was merely a “pilot project” for The Global Virome Project (GVP), which plans to map the genomes of more than 500,000 viruses around the world at an estimated cost of $1.2 billion. GVP plans to sample
The purpose of GVP is to better prepare the world for future pandemics. The ultimate goal of the program is to create “a universal flu vaccine and could potentially help with the development of a similar vaccine for coronaviruses” to cover all SARS, MERS, COVID-19 viruses and their variants. Therefore, GVP’s research will fall within the sampling and vaccine exemptions to the ePPP restrictions.JANUARY 19, 2018—The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) solicits interest for the PREEMPT (Preventing Emerging Pathogenic Threats) program.
The same day, the U.S. Embassy in Beijing released a report regarding WIV stating, “the new [BSL-4[ lab has a serious shortage of appropriately trained technicians and investigators needed to safely operate this high-containment laboratory. . . . Reportedly, researchers from [the University of Texas Media Branch in Galveston’s BSL-4 lab] are helping train technicians who work in the WIV BSL-4 lab.”MARCH 24, 2018—EcoHealth submits a proposal to DARPA under the PREEMPT contract offer.
EHA responded to the solicitation seeking funding for a separate proposal called “Project DEFUSE: Defusing the Threat of Bat-borne Coronaviruses.” Daszak requested $14,209,245 on behalf of EcoHealth to fund Project DEFUSE for three and a half years.
In the first phase, EHA would “intensively sample bats at our field sites” in “three caves in Yunnan Province, China.” These field sites represented a heighted risk of spillover to human populations, according to EHA.
Then the researchers would sample the bats “spike proteins, reverse engineer them to conduct binding assays, and insert them into bat SARSr-CoV (WIV1, SHC014) backbones (these use bat-SARSr-CoV backbones, not SARS-CoV, and are exempt from dual-use and gain of function concerns) to infect humanized mice and assess capacity to cause SARS-like disease.” (Emphasis added.) (Dual-use research of concern is technology that can be used for peaceful and military purposes.)
The researchers would next model the data to build “machine-learning genotype-phenotype models of viral evolution and spillover risk.” (Emphasis added.) The researchers would validate the model “with serology from previously-collected human samples via LIPS assays that assess which spike proteins allow spillover into people.”
In the second phase, EHA would evaluate two different approaches to reduce viral shedding in bat caves. One option was “broadscale immune boosting, in which [the researchers would] inoculate bats with immune modulators to upregulate their immune response and downregulate viral replication.” The second option was “targeted immune boosting” to “inoculate bats with novel chimeric polyvalent recombinant spike proteins plus the immune modulator to enhance innate immunity against specific, high-risk viruses.”Based on “stochastic simulation modeling informed by field and experimental data,” the researchers would then test the most effective biologicals by spraying an aerosol on the bats at the entrance to the roosting nests at the field sites, to test whether the interventions reduced viral shedding from the bats.
APRIL 13, 2018—EcoHealth submits its year-four progress report to NIH.
APRIL 25, 2018—Daszak emails Stemmy with another summary of the highlights from the fourth year. No specific mention is made in Daszak’s email regarding the recent WIV1/SHC014 experiment that triggered the 1 log reporting requirement in the award terms.
By this time, Daszak knew his previous advice to NIH, that EcoHealth’s research “should not have enhanced pathogenicity in animals,” was false, because at least one (1) experiment shoed log 4 viral growth in humanized mice with the ACE2 reception.JULY 7, 2018—NIAID program officers exempt EcoHealth from the P3CO framework—as reported by The Intercept:
But what happened next sets off alarm bells for biosafety advocates: Agency staff adopted language that EcoHealth Alliance crafted to govern its own work. The agency inserted several sentences into grant materials describing immediate actions the group would take if the viruses they created proved to become more transmissible or disease-causing as the result of the experiments.
In December 2017, the funding for some gain-of-function research was resumed under carefully constructed guidelines for “Potential Pandemic Pathogen Care and Oversight,” or P3CO — but the language suggested by Daszak helped the group evade this oversight as well. In July 2018, NIAID program officers decided that the experiments on humanized mice — which had been conducted a few months earlier — would get a pass from these restrictions as long as EcoHealth Alliance immediately notified appropriate agency officials according to the circumstances that the group had laid out.
Regulating risky research is the NIH’s role. But Daszak gave his group a way out. If the recombinant viruses grew more quickly than the original viruses on which they were based, he suggested, EcoHealth Alliance and its collaborators would immediately stop its research and inform their NIAID program officer.
Specifically, he suggested a threshold beyond which his researchers would not go: If the novel SARS or MERS chimeras showed evidence of enhanced virus growth greater than 1 log (or 10 times) over the original viruses and grow more efficiently in human lung cells, the scientist would immediately stop their experiments with the mutant viruses and inform their NIAID program officer.In a July 7 letter to EcoHealth Alliance, NIH’s Greer and Stemmy formally accepted Daszak’s proposed rule. The chimeric viruses were “not reasonably anticipated” to “have enhanced pathogenicity and/or transmissibility in mammals via the respiratory route,” the administrators concluded, according to the transcribed emails.
The language that the NIH later inserted into the grant was strikingly similar to what Daszak proposed: “Should any of the MERS-like or SARS-like chimeras generated under this grant show evidence of enhanced virus growth greater than 1 log over the parental backbone strain you must stop all experiments with these viruses.”
OCTOBER 26, 2018—Daszak assures NIH EcoHealth is in compliance with grant requirements—as reported by The Intercept:
In a letter sent to NIH on October 26, Daszak insisted EcoHealth Alliance did comply with all the requirements of its NIH grant, pointing out that the group reported the results of its experiment in its year four progress report, which it submitted to the agency in April 2018 — and that no one at the agency responded to the description of the experiment. “At no time did program staff indicate to us that this work required further clarification or secondary review,” he wrote.
SEPTEMBER 2019—The online public database with the genetic sequences of the coronaviruses that WIV is working on is deleted.
NOVEMBER 17, 2019—the U.S. Embassy in Beijing sends a report titled, “Plague Cases Show China’s Crisis Communication Improving, But Public Doubts Remain.”
On November 12, 2019, Chinese health officials announced that two individuals in Beijing had been diagnosed with pneumonic plague, the only form of the disease that can transmit from person to person.
On November 3, Beijing's Chaoyang Hospital admitted a man-ied couple with severe pneumonia who had been transferred by ambulance from Inner Mongolia after their symptoms worsened. The hospital diagnosed the patients with pneumonic plague on November 11 and the Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention (China CDC) confomed the diagnoses on November 12. Authorities then transferred the couple to Beijing's Ditan Hospital for specialized care. China CDC believes the husband likely contracted the disease while working the soil on his farm after a large rodent die-off in the area.
Many netizens speculated that Chinese censors controlled social media postings related to plague as had been reported in international media. Some netizens complained that"cover-ups only make things worse!" Others reacted to reports that Chaoyang Hospital's diagnosing physician had her November 13 social media post about the cases censored and wondered about the health of the doctors treating the patients. Media reported that the doctor, in a since-deleted social media post titled, "Are you afraid ofplague? Beijing's pneumonic plague patients first doctors have something to say," described the patients arriving to Beijing on November 3 with severe pneumonia and noting that she originally had trouble diagnosing which pathogen caused the illness, but suspected it was rare.
(Emphasis added.)
*** The content below was generated by artificial intelligence using o1 pro ***
Pneumonic plague is primarily diagnosed by combining clinical findings (sudden onset of fever, cough, breathing difficulty, and exposure history) with laboratory tests (culturing Yersinia pestis from respiratory specimens, blood tests, or rapid antigen/PCR tests). A high clinical suspicion plus confirmatory lab evidence—such as a positive culture or molecular test—provides a definitive diagnosis.Clinical Suspicion
Pneumonic plague presents with rapid onset of high fever, chills, cough (possibly with bloody sputum), chest pain, and difficulty breathing.
A person’s exposure history is crucial: recent travel to plague-endemic regions, contact with sick animals or fleas, or close association with another pneumonic plague patient raises suspicion.
Laboratory Testing
Sputum or respiratory specimens: Collecting sputum (phlegm) and performing a culture to see if the bacterium Yersinia pestis grows is the most direct way to confirm pneumonic plague.
Blood culture: Y. pestis can sometimes be isolated from the bloodstream, especially early in the disease course.
Lymph node aspirate (in bubonic cases that progress or coexist with pneumonic symptoms): If accessible lymph nodes are enlarged, aspirated fluid can be tested for Y. pestis.
Microscopic techniques:
Gram stain or Wayson stain may reveal characteristic, Gram-negative “safety-pin” rods.
Rapid immunofluorescence assays (e.g., direct fluorescent antibody [DFA] test) detect plague-specific antigens such as the F1 antigen.
Molecular tests (PCR):
PCR assays for Y. pestis DNA can provide faster, highly specific detection compared to culture. Often used in reference labs or advanced clinical centers.
*** The content above was generated by artificial intelligence using o1 pro ***DECEMBER 21, 2019—A novel beta coronavirus breaks out in Wuhan at a wet market a few miles away from WIV.
Recall that prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, but after creating a novel SARS chimera that dramatically increased the lethality and transmissibility of a coronavirus in humanized mice, EcoHealth’s proposal for Project DEFUSE proposed inserting novel spike genes and a furin cleavage site (“FSC”) at the S1-S2 border in bat SARS-like coronaviruses.
Notably, none of the more than a hundred (100+) SARS-like coronaviruses known to occur naturally have a FSC. But SARS-CoV-2 has a FCS at the spike gene S1-S2 border—exactly as EcoHealth had proposed doing on MARCH 24, 2018.
Further, COVID-19 demonstrates a high affinity for binding to human cells because its FCS has the exact amino-acid-sequence identity to the FSC of human ENaCA.JANUARY 24-29, 2020—The displayed location for WIV on Google Maps is moved further away from the wet market. WIV is in fact located 8.6 miles from the wet market, as shown on Google Maps and corroborating satellite imagery on January 24, 2020. By January 29, 2020, Google Maps is showing WIV is located further south, some 21.7 miles away from the wet market.
FEBRUARY 2, 2020—Sir Jeremy Farrar, director of the British medical charity foundation Wellcome Trust and adviser to the UK government, wrote in an email to Fauci that a “likely explanation” could be WIV “accidentally (created) a virus that would be primed for rapid transmission between humans.” Sir Jeremy assessed the lab was the origin of the virus with 60-70 percent confidence.
According to Sir Jeremy, Dr. Mike Furzan, who discovered MERS, was “bothered by the furin site and has a hard time explain that as an event outside the lab (though, there are possible ways in nature, but highly unlikely).”
Dr. Robert Garry, Professor of Virology at the University of Texas at Austin, responded the same day, “I really can’t think of a plausible natural scenario where you get from the bat virus or one very similar to it to nCoV where you insert exactly 4 amino acids 12 nucleotide that all have to be added at the exact same time to gain this function – that and you don’t change any other amino acid in S2? I just can’t figure out how this gets accomplished in nature.” (Emphasis added.)FEBRUARY 4, 2020—Sir Jeremy reported in the February 2 email chain that Dr. Eddie Holmes, a world authority on virus evolution, was “60-40” in favor of the lab origin hypothesis over zoonosis.
FEBRUARY 19, 2020—The Lancet publishes a letter stating COVID-19 has a natural origin and framing the lab origin hypothesis as a conspiracy theory.
“We stand together to strongly condemn conspiracy theories suggesting that COVID-19 does not have a natural origin,” wrote more than 20 prominent scientists. Sir Jeremy signed the letter in direct contradiction of his express opinion from only 16 days prior.Daszak organized the publication of infamous letter in The Lancet and in fact drafted key language. But Daszak decided not to sign the letter in order to avoid the appearance of a conflict of interest, which conflict of interest was real and not merely apparent.
I spoke with Linfa [Wang] last night about the statement we sent round. He thinks, and I agree with him, that you, me and him should not sign this statement, so it has some distance from us and therefore doesn’t work in a counterproductive way.
[. . .]
We’ll then put it out in a way that doesn’t link it back to our collaboration so we maximize an independent voice.
“I also think this is a good decision. Otherwise it looks self-serving and we lose impact,” Dr. Ralph Baric replied. Baric is a professor in the Department of Microbiology and Immunology at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Like Daszak, Baric has an interest in GoF research and is the inventor of the “No See ‘Em technique” that hides genetic modifications to viruses by making them appear as if they occurred naturally.
Daszak was part of the WHO investigation team who went to China in February 2020, which concluded the lab leak hypothesis was “extremely unlikely.” Daszak persuaded other scientists to publish disinformation with the explicit purpose of dissuading further investigation into the possibility of a lab leak. Daszak only signed his name to the letter in The Lancet and declared his conflict-of-interest with EHA after FOIA revealed his central role in manufacturing the letter.
FEBRUARY 24, 2020—the most senior CCP military scientist, Dr. Zhou Yusen, patented a vaccine for COVID-19 on February 24, 2020, only a few weeks after the outbreak in Wuhan occurred
APRIL 19, 2020—NIH writes to EcoHealth informing that NIH intends to pursue suspension of WIV from participation in federal grant programs due to allegations COVID-19 leaked from WIV. NIH orders EcoHealth to cease providing grant funds to WIV.
APRIL 21, 2020—Daszak responds to NIH, stating he could “categorically state that no funds from [the year-six grant under R01AI110964] have been sent to Wuhan Institute of Virology, nor has any contract been signed.”
APRIL 24, 2020—NIH terminates EcoHealth’s project “Understanding the Risk of Bat Coronavirus Emergence” (Federal Award Identification Number R01AI110964).
APRIL 26, 2020—Dr. David M. Morens, Senior Advisor to NIAID Director Fauci, emails Daszak and Dr. Gerald T. Keusch (then associate provost for global health at Boston University Medical Campus, previously associate director of international research at the National Institutes of Health from 1998 to 2003).
Jerry and Peter,
This is sent from my gmail account. Please send all replies here To gmail.
I have let Tony know but have not spoken to him directly. There are things I can’t say except Tony is aware and I have learned that there are ongoing efforts within NIH to steer through this with minimal damage to you, Peter, and colleagues, and to nit and naiad. No guarantees, but let us hope. I imagine this will be handled at the level of Francis and Tony, within nih, and I don’t expect to be in the loop.
I don’t have any insight into what happened or how it happened, but the fact that your termination letter came from “Building 1,” that is, the NIH directors office, and not from NIAID, is telling
Whatever is going on, I very much doubt that Tony or any of our naiad leadership would willfully throw you under the bus, or any grantee, for that matter. Indeed, I expect we would do everything possible to protect you. I have reason to believe that there are already efforts going on to protect you.(Emphases added.)
MAY 12, 2020—Morens emails Keusch.
Jerry, my private gmail account is where I send this from, after forwarding to myself from my nih account
Please try to send only to my gmail, as we were doing a couple weeks ago. But I messed up a few times and sent from my nih account, because on my phone the two are merged, and then when you respond by hitting reply it goes to nih
After some recent issues, I am going to try to strictly use only my gmail in these discussions, that is, [REDACTED].(Emphasis added.)
JUNE 16, 2020—Morens emails Daszak, Keusch, and two (2) other employees at EcoHealth saying, “We are all smart enough to know to never have smoking guns, and if we did we wouldn’t put them in emails and if we found them we’d delete them.” (Emphasis added.)
JULY 8, 2020—NIH reinstates EcoHealth’s grant under R01AI110964 but then immediately suspends the award. NIH noted with concern that EcoHealth had not reported any of their subawards to WIV. NIH also condition reinstated of EcoHealth’s award on answering specific questions, including demanding responses to what happened to WIV researcher Huang Yanling and an explanation for why WIV failed to note RaTG13 was collected from a mine in 2012 where three (3) men died from an illness similar to COVID-19. (EcoHealth’s lawyers responded with objections to the specific questions and did not provide substantive responses.)
(Source.) AUGUST 27, 2020—Morens emails Daszak and Keusch.
Ahem…. doI get a kickback???? Too much fooking money! DO you deserve it all? Let’s discuss…. Seriously, this is great news. Well deserved…, There is still justice in a Trump-infected universe…. d
(Emphasis added.) Daszack responds four (4) hours later.
Thanks for your kind words, and of course there’s a kick-back. It starts with 5 more years of FoIA requests (jean Patterson told me they received a nasty phone call over a month ago when it went up on NIHReporter.gov from the person who FoIA’d our Ro1). I just hope it doesn’t culminate in 5 years in Federal jail, or even Chinese ‘re-education camp’ . . . .
(Emphasis added.)
FEBRUARY 24, 2021—Morens writes an email to an undisclosed recipient.
You are right, I need to be more careful. However, as I mentioned once before, I learned from our foil lady here hot to make emails disappear after I am fora’d but before the search starts, so I think we are all safe. Plus I deleted most of those earlier emails after sending them to gmail. D
FEBRUARY 25, 2021—Morens emails Keusch and Daszak.
It’s more in the line of govt secret, but too complicated to explain in an email. But I learned the tricks last year from an old friend, Marg Moore, who heads our FOIA office and also hates FOIAs.
(Emphases added.)
APRIL 21, 2021—Morens emails Daszak.
PS, I forgot to say there is no worry about FOIAs. I can either send stuff to Tony on his private email, or hand it to him at work or at his house. He is too smart to let colleagues send him stuff that could cause trouble. D
(Emphases added.)
MAY 10, 2021—the day before Fauci is scheduled to testify to Congress, Baric writes to Daszak informing Daszak that at least (2) and possibly three (3) of WIV’s published, peer-reviewed articles concerning coronavirus research occurred in BSL-2 level safety conditions, at least throughout 2020, according to the articles themselves.
MAY 11, 2021—Fauci testifies to Congress that “NIH has not ever and does not now fund gain-of-function research in the Wuhan Institute of Virology.” Fauci further testifies, “I do not have any accounting of what the Chinese may have done, and I am fully in favor of any further investigation of what went on in China. However, I will repeat, again, the NIH and NIAID categorically has not funded gain-of-function to be conducted in the Wuhan Institute of Virology.” (Emphasis added.)
MAY 13, 2021—Morens emails Keusch and Dr. Rich Roberts (British Nobel laureate, biochemist, and molecular biologist at New England Biolabs) with Daszak in ‘cc.
Thanks, Jerry, for speaking to him. I sent him the article you mentioned shortly after I saw it, and I have also been talking to Arthur on background about this over recent months.
Bravo for what you said, which is pretty much what I have been saying to him.
I suggested Arthur try to interview Tony directly and connected him to our “secret” back channel. He emailed Tony a few hours ago.
[ ]
He did not know about either the Miller Commission or the letter from Rep Rogers which I emailed to him on gmail later.(Emphases added.)
MAY 27, 2021—Daszak responds to Baric’s concerns stating, “In China, the rules allow for organizations to conduct culture of animal viruses at BSL-2, including chimeras. We checked [Shi] Zhengli, who let us know that she used ‘BSL-2 with negative pressure and appropriate PPE.’ I also know that they are stricter now on SADS-Cov (it’s BSL-3 I believe) ever since you showed it was able to infect human airway epithelial cells, so that's evidence they do take these things more seriously than it would seem on the surface.” (Emphasis added.)
Six (6) hours later, Baris responds, “Sorry Peter. Your [sic.] being told a bunch of BS. Bsl2 w negative pressure, give me a break. There [sic.] last paper mentioned bsl2 w appropriate PPE. . . . I have no doubt that they followed state determined rules and did the work under bsl2. Yes china has the right to set their own policy. You believe this was appropriate containment if you want but don’t expect me to believe it. Moreover, don’t insult my intelligence by trying to feed me this load of BS.”
MAY 28, 2021—Dr. Karen E. R. Lampe of the Freedom of Information Office at the National Institutes of Health emails a number of people in NIH and NIAID stating, “We have just received word from HHS Oversight via [Office of the General Counsel] that we should not release anything having to do with EcoHealth Alliance/WIV.”
AUGUST 3, 2021—EcoHealth submits its year-five report.
OCTOBER 20, 2021—NIH Director Tabak writes to Representative James Comer, Ranking Member of the House’s Committee on Oversight and Reform. Dr. Tabak, admitting EcoHealth’s research at WIV in 2018 unintentionally led to gain-in-function:
[A] limited experiment . . . testing if spike proteins from naturally occurring bat coronaviruses circulating in China were capable of binding to the human ACE2 receptor in a mouse model. All other aspects of the mice, including the immune system, remained unchanged. In this limited experiment, laboratory mice infected with the SHC014 WIVI bat coronavirus became sicker than those infected with the WIV1 bat coronavirus. As sometimes occurs in science, this was an unexpected result of the research, as opposed to something that the researchers set out to do. Regardless, the viruses being studied under this grant were genetically very distant from SARS-CoV-2.\
In relation to the log 4 growth in the 2018 experiment Tabak states, “EcoHealth failed to report this finding right away, as was required by the terms of the grant.” (Note: it is not clear when exactly the experiment occurred in early 2018, but its results were buried in the year-four report and not separately reported.)
The letter also noted that WIV had collected RaTG13, one of the closest bat coronavirus relatives to SARS-CoV-2.OCTOBER 25, 2021—Keusch emails Daszak.
I just spent some time not he phone with David. He is concerned about the privacy of text and other messages from his cell phone to you and me because he has been using a government phone which permits personal oncversations as well. So even things via gmail sent and received on his cell phone could be FOIA’able. This came from Tony in their conversation this morning.
David has multiple things going on this week, including medical appointments, closing on house, and need to get himself a personal smart phone, and Tony has told him not to be in touch with and EHA for the time being.(Emphases added.)
In a separate email the same day, Morens tells Daszak and Keusch, “Peter, from Tony’s numerous recent comments to me, and from what Francis has been vocal about over the past 5 days, they are trying to protect you, which also protects their own reputations.” (Emphasis added.)OCTOBER 26, 2021—Daszak responds to NIH request for EcoHealth’s unpublished data.
Daszak provided NIH with a phylogenetic tree from two (2) new coronaviruses developed at WUV in 2018 showing the viruses are not related. Daszak states, “The RdRp sequences for these two viruses are now going through approval process by Chinese authorities so that they can be uploaded to Genbank at the earliest possible opportunity.”
Daszak stated the viruses were sampled from bats in Hubei and Yunnan provinces. EcoHealth’s Project DEFUSE proposal had sought to test the binding affinity of spike proteins to ACE2 receptors using bat coronaviruses sourced from Yunnan province. This suggests EcoHealth may have proceeded with Project DEFUSE or participated in a similar project in coordination with or with funding from China, after DARPA’s decision not to award ~$14.2m to EcoHealth to fund the project.
Daszak denied the two (2) viruses the were the progenitor viruses to COVID-19 on the basis COVID-19 is a beta-coronavirus and the two (2) 2018 viruses EcoHealth reported to NIH were alpha-coronaviruses. Daszak also pointed that the BANAL coronaviruses, collected from caves in Laos, were the closest known relatives of SARS-CoV-2. However, even RaTG13 and BANAL-52 are far too divergent to be the progenitor of SARS-CoV-2.
Daszack continued, “We have requested that the 13 other novel RdRp sequences (in bold) included in Figure 5 of our year 5 report to be uploaded to Genbank. These are now going through the approval process by Chinese authorities so that they can be uploaded to Genbank at the earliest possible opportunity.
Therefore, according to Daszak, the CCP censor were screening information about the viruses that EcoHealth was funding at WIV before EcoHealth had access to the information. Daszak appears not to have had access to thirteen (13) of the fifteen (15) RdRp sequences he references in his letter.
Crucially, if WIV was collecting other bat coronaviruses through Chinese government programs or the GVP, and not under one of EcoHealth’s grants from NIH, then EcoHealth and NIH would not have access to this data before publication. Thus, RaTG13 might not be the closest progenitor to SARS-CoV-2 that is in WIV’s possession and BANAL-52 may not be the closest known virus to the pandemic strain.
Separately, Daszak argued that EcoHealth’s year-four progress report timely disclosed the fact that one of EHA’s experiments at WIV in early 2018 resulted in a novel SARS chimera with 4 log (10,000 times) greater growth than the parent virus.NOVEMBER 5, 2021—NIAID writes to Daszak requested “complete and dated copies of the original laboratory notebook entries and of the original electronic files that led to the generation of the Year 4 RPPR Figure 35 and Year 5 I-RPPR Figure 13, along with all their accompany texts[.]”
NOVEMBER 18, 2021—Daszak responds to NIAID stating, “[EcoHealth] does not have copies of these, which were created by and retained by the WIV. Nonetheless, I have forwarded your letter to the WIV, and will let you know their response as soon as WIV replies to our request.”
Later the same day, Morens writes to Keusch.
Jerry, I am updating you on my computer and gag order situation. With the help of our IT folks, I went over the whole computer and phone situation. They loaded some ant-hacking [sic.] software on my phone and discussed the situation with me.
Basically, my gmail is now safe from FOIA and hacking on all of my devices, including government computer and phone, and my private computer and iPad.
Thus it should be safe to communicate safely with you, Peter, and others, as long as we use my private gmail. . . . I ask you both that NOTHING gets sent to me except to my gmail, and make sure that what gets sent to my gmail doesn’t have a cc to another government employee who could be FOIA’d.(Emphases added.)
NOVEMBER 19, 2021—Morens emails Keusch.
I forgot to clarify in my emails yesterday that BOTH my gmail and phone calls are now safe. Text is NOT, as it can be FOIA’d, as can my govt email.
So you and Peter and others should be able to email me on gmail only, with the caveat that no other govt. employee is copied at a govt. address, as all govt emails are potentially FOIA’able.
(Emphases added.)JANUARY 6, 2022—NIH writes to Daszak informing him that EcoHealth is non-compliant with the terms of award R01AI110964, which requires the federal government to have the right to original notebook entries and computer files created by WIV and held in WIV’s possession.
AUGUST 19, 2022—NIH terminates the subaward to WIR under R01AI110964.
APRIL 26, 2023—NIAID restarts funding to EcoHealth for under R01AI110964, awarding EcoHealth $576,290 for 2023; $568,370 for 2024; $568,370 for 2025; and $568,370 for 2026.
NOVEMBER 14, 2023—Dazsack testifies to Congress. He admits that the only information he has to confirm his representation to NIH that EcoHealth only funded one (1) and not two (2) experiments in 2018 that violated award conditions regarding log 1 came from a phone call to someone at WIV, likely Zhengli, who said WIV had only performed one (1) experiment that triggered the reporting requirement.
January 22, 2024—Baric testifies to Congress regarding EcoHealth’s research WIV. His testimony is summarized, below:
*** The content below was generated by artificial intelligence using o1 pro ***
EcoHealth Alliance Grant(s)EcoHealth Alliance (EHA), led by Dr. Peter Daszak, had NIH (NIAID) funding to study bat coronaviruses, including subawards to the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV) in China.
Dr. Baric was listed as a collaborator on certain EHA grants but emphasizes that his lab did not conduct the WIV portion of the work.
The One Log Growth Rule
Following Obama-era “gain of function (GOF) pause” policies, some grants imposed an internal safeguard:
If an experimental coronavirus strain shows >10x (one log) higher viral titer or increased lethality in mice, the researchers must stop and notify NIH and the local Institutional Biosafety Committee (IBC).
Dr. Baric explained that 10x growth is a practical threshold—plaque assays can vary ~2–3-fold, so 10x signals a real, meaningful change.
Alleged Non-Reporting Under EHA Grant
In the hearing, Committee staff highlighted that EcoHealth’s progress reports (year 4 vs. year 5) showed data consistent with >1-log increased viral growth and higher lethality in humanized mice infected with certain chimeric SARS-like viruses (e.g., SHC014 on the WIV1 backbone).
Dr. Baric noted that these data likely should have triggered the “pause & notify” condition but also stressed the details matter: e.g., whether sufficient sample size, statistics, or final repeat experiments existed.
NIH Oversight
Congressional members expressed concern that NIH oversight sometimes relies on incomplete data or inconsistent progress reports.
Dr. Baric believes “statistics should be there” for final clarity—and that some form of standardized, stepwise oversight is needed, rather than one-size-fits-all regulation.
Chinese BSL-2 vs. BSL-3 Practices
Dr. Baric repeatedly noted that the WIV historically cultured bat coronaviruses at BSL-2 for discovery work, even though he and many U.S. scientists prefer BSL-3 (a higher containment) for such viruses.
Animal infection experiments in China, however, were reportedly done at BSL-3.
DEFUSE (DARPA) Proposal
In 2018, EcoHealth Alliance assembled a DARPA proposal called “DEFUSE,” including Dr. Baric as a co-investigator, to study potential furin cleavage sites and other aspects of SARS-like coronaviruses.
The proposal was not funded. Certain text from draft documents suggested EcoHealth’s desire to “downplay the non-U.S. focus” or “shift” Chinese lab work to look better for DARPA. Baric himself discouraged BSL-2 usage or concealment of foreign-lab components.
Baric’s Stance on COVID-19 Origins
He outlined three possible origins:
Natural Spillover (he sees this as the most likely, given the scale of wildlife exposures),
Accidental Lab Escape (could happen if WIV was culturing a virus that infected a lab worker),
Bioengineered Virus (he sees no evidence for purposeful engineering).
Baric opposes the notion that SARS-CoV-2 was a de novo laboratory construct; no known “close-enough” backbone existed for a direct gene insert to produce SARS-CoV-2 from prior isolates.
*** The content above was generated by artificial intelligence using o1 pro ***
15 MAY, 2024—HHS suspends all of EcoHealth’s federal grants and proposes debarment.
17 JANUARY, 2025—HHS formally debars EcoHealth and Daszak.
25 JANUARY, 2025—CIA releases updated assessment with low confidence COVID-19 leaked from WIV.
Conclusions
The timeline clearly establishes Daszak had multiple conflicts of interest. His financial conflicts included EcoHealth’s million-dollar awards involving WIV and his interest in securing investment from the U.S. and CCP for the $1b+ GVP, which was planned to have a $5m annual operating budget. His professional conflicts included a more than decade-long relationship with Chinese virologists and researchers, particularly at WIV, and in particular Zhengli, who were and remain under the de facto control of the Chinese Communist Party. His personal conflicts included his zealous interest in pandemic prevention through preemptive vaccines, even at the expenses of proper regard for safety and risk management; his longstanding relationships with NIH/NIAID officials, in particular Fauci, as well as researchers at WIV; and his political opinion that the U.S. and China should cooperate in pursuit of pandemic prevention.
Despite being uniquely placed to discover the truth of COVID-19’s origins, given his relationship with WIV, and despite being privy to the early opinions of the world’s leading experts that the novel virus probably leaked from WIV, Daszak conspired to organize a disinformation campaign in the Lancet to prematurely shut down investigation into the proximal origins of COVID-19, just when it was needed most. In doing so, he displayed a clear decision to prioritize his personal, professional, and financial interests, and the interests of the CCP, WIV, NIH/NIAID, and his colleagues, ahead of the well-being of all others and global public safety. The purpose of the conspiracy was to obstruct justice and delay truth.
This conspiracy then continued in “secret” backchannels that directly connected Daszak and Fauci through couriers. Morens worked as Fauci’s right-hand and Keusch stood ready to receive messages from Morens to pass to Daszak when Morens and Daszak were unable to communicate directly. The conspirators displayed a concerted and repeated (and completely amateur) effort to avoid the Freedom of Information Act by using private emails. It is important to understand though that Morens’ communications were on a government device, which NSA/CIA could access with warantless surveillance, such that the intelligence community knew all of this was happening, as it was happening.
When NIH cancelled EcoHealth’s grant, Daszak immediately used the back channel to Fauci to lobby Fauci to lobby NHI Director Collins personally to reinstate the award, which was done promptly. After the award was reinstated, Morens emailed Daszak jokingly asking for a kickback. Daszak responded jokingly saying he would of course give Morens a kickback, presumably from the taxpayer-funded award monies.
The record also establishes Baric emailed Daszak the day before Fauci was due to testify to Congress raising concerns research at WIV was taking place in BSL-2 conditions. Morens again used the backchannel with Daszak and Keusch a couple days after Fauci testified, purportedly to try to connect Fauci with a journalist for an interview. In exchanges that follow, Morens explicitly states NIH/NIAID and Fauci had the goal of protecting Daszak and EcoHealth and WIV and the Chinese researchers from further scrutiny over COVID-19’s origins.
Further, there are worrying signs of state involvement in the conspiracy. Google’s decision in late January 2020 to move the location of WIV on Google Maps—a transparent attempt to attenuate the connection between ground zero at the wet market and WIV—could have been CIA conduct and, in any event, was most definitely at least noticed by CIA.
Then there is Morens email saying his IT team had installed ‘anti-virus’ on all of his work and personal devices, and repeated recommendations to avoid FOIA “in the line of government secret.” These facts suggest intelligence services identified Morens as a potential target for surveillance and sent a counter-intelligence technical team to secure his devices.
It seemed Morens was working with the knowledge of his impunity for FOIA violations. He bragged that he learned how to avoid FOIA and delete emails from his head of FOIA before searches could be started. Then HHS’s general counsel blocks any responses to all the initial FOIA requests for Daszak’s communications.
Lastly, there is of course no forgetting the global mass disinformation campaign that propagated for months through the state’s usual parrots, first in attempt to convince people COVID-19 was just the flu, and then to shut down any debate over whether the virus came from the lab.
There are so many questions that remain unanswered:
Was the plague that came from Inner Mongolia and spread in Beijing misdiagnosed and could it to be the progenitor, or is that just a red herring? If so, was that virus sent to WIV for research?
What happened to Wenliang and the other disappeared doctors?
Who moved the location of WIV on Google Maps?
How did China patent a working vaccine only 65 days after the outbreak?
What as the intelligence community achieved to-date in tracing the early cases back to specific locations and occupations?
Finally, there is no getting around the damning circumstantial evidence and scientific evidence. EcoHealth gave detailed plans to DARPA specifying WIV would insert novel spike genes and a furin cleavage site (“FSC”) at the S1-S2 border in bat SARS-like coronaviruses to infect humanized mice to create vaccines. The novel virus is the only virus in existence to have this genetic feature and facilitates a high affinity for binding to human cells, because its FCS has the exact amino-acid-sequence identity to the FSC of human ENaCA. Therefore, there is strong scientific evidence COVID-19 is the genetically modified virus—specifically: the exact virus EcoHealth asked DARPA to fund.
When EcoHealth did not get funding for the project from DARPA, WIV may have just turned around and conducted the same research anyway—without EcoHealth or NIH/NIAID’s knowledge—with funding from the Chinese government.
I respectfully suggest there is more than enough evidence to make this assessment with at least moderate confidence. I also disagree that conclusive proof of the progenitor is the only viable avenue for further inquiry that could result in a high confidence assessment, if not complete conviction.
The only thing for certain is the government knows more than it is telling us.
Limited Hangout
*** The content below was generated by artificial intelligence using o1 pro ***
1. Quick Recap: What Is a “Limited Hangout”?
A limited hangout is an intelligence or PR tactic in which an organization discloses a relatively minor or partial set of facts—often in response to external pressure—to appear transparent or to deflect deeper probing. The goal is to maintain credibility while concealing more damaging or definitive truths.
2. Barnes Article: Original Key Points
CIA Shift: The article reports that the CIA, previously “on the sidelines,” now “favors” a lab-leak explanation (though the piece labels it a “low confidence” conclusion).
No New Intelligence: The agency’s reorientation allegedly relies on the same evidence as before.
Emphasis on New Leadership: John Ratcliffe, as the new CIA director, is personally convinced about a lab leak and wants the Agency’s public stance to reflect that.
Ambiguity Remains: The article claims the intelligence community is still split; no conclusive “smoking gun” intelligence has surfaced.
3. The “Updated Assessment on COVID-19 Origins”: Key Takeaways
This declassified report, with information through August 2021, provides the following relevant context:
IC Split on the Origins
Multiple agencies maintain a low-confidence natural-origin view; one IC element moderately confident in a lab-associated incident.
Others remain undecided.
No Evidence of a Bioweapon
The report categorically rules out SARS-CoV-2 being deliberately developed as a weapon.
Likely Not Engineered
Most agencies judge (with low confidence) that the virus is probably not genetically engineered, but can’t fully exclude stealthy methods.
China’s Lack of Foreknowledge
The report consistently highlights that Chinese officials likely did not know about SARS-CoV-2 before it emerged, implying no early conspiracy at a high political level.
Need for New Data
The IC contends it cannot definitively settle the debate without additional information (e.g., a proven direct progenitor virus in nature, or evidence that Wuhan labs handled SARS-CoV-2 or a close relative).
Chinese Obstruction
China’s refusal to share data and cooperate with investigations remains a central barrier to resolving the question.
Overall, the IC assessment underscores deep uncertainty due to limited data and concludes that both natural and lab-associated origins remain plausible.
4. Incorporating the IC Assessment into the “Limited Hangout” Analysis
4.1 How the New Assessment Informs the Lab Leak vs. Natural Origin Debate
No Definitive Conclusion: The 2021 report reveals a persistent lack of consensus among intelligence agencies. That lines up with the Barnes article’s portrayal of continued uncertainty but a new leaning from the CIA.
Multiple Agencies, Different Confidence Levels: The IC document clarifies that any shift by a single agency (e.g., the CIA) likely rests on partial evidence and a different weighting of the same incomplete data—hence “low confidence.”
Lab Incident Hypothesis Is Neither Confirmed Nor Ruled Out: The updated assessment shows it has always been one of two main plausible theories. The CIA’s newly expressed stance could be read as aligning with the single “moderate confidence” agency in the 2021 data or shifting from “undecided” to “leaning lab leak” post-2021.
4.2 Does the Barnes Article Reflect a “Limited Hangout” Strategy?
Recap of Barnes article considerations suggesting a possible limited hangout:
It Acknowledges a Lab-Leak While Maintaining “Low Confidence”
This partially concedes a position that many had demanded acknowledgment of.
Could function to appease critics or quell accusations of a “cover-up” while not revealing any explosive new evidence.
No Fresh Intel
The article reemphasizes that no new intelligence prompted the stance. If a more damning or decisive set of facts exists (e.g., secret data directly confirming a leak), then saying “we have nothing new” might be a way to avoid revealing it.
Ratcliffe’s Personal Influence
The piece frames the CIA’s pivot largely around the new director’s known biases. That can “personalize” the reasoning and distract from the possibility that the CIA might actually hold more conclusive data.
Ongoing “Fuzziness”
Both the Barnes piece and the IC assessment underscore uncertainty and stress that the “low confidence” label remains. As a limited hangout, this approach provides an admission without letting readers believe the matter is settled. The conversation can end in a stalemate: “We’re acknowledging the lab leak possibility, but we still don’t have definitive proof.”
Incorporating the Newly Released Report
The new IC assessment reveals that by late 2021, agencies had already acknowledged lab origin as plausible—some with a level of confidence.
If the CIA had more conclusive data, the updated assessment presumably would show it. However, the August 2021 document states both theories remain viable. Thus, the Barnes article’s claim that CIA “favors” lab leak in 2025 might simply reflect an overdue alignment with what some in the IC had already been suspecting (in moderate-to-low confidence).
Implication for “Limited Hangout?”
Pro-Lab Leak Lean is not necessarily a new revelation if at least one agency in 2021 was already “moderately confident.” The Barnes article’s “CIA shift” could be a partial concession—mirroring or echoing the prior single element that favored a lab-leak.
By framing it as “we used the same evidence, just reinterpreted,” the article might downplay any possibility that the IC has discovered robust new proof. If there were indeed stronger data (e.g., lab records, internal Chinese documents), the new public stance could be a controlled disclosure that stops short of laying out everything.
On the other hand, the 2021 IC assessment emphasizes how incomplete the data set is. If that truly hasn’t changed, the CIA’s shift could be genuine rather than orchestrated. In that scenario, calling it a limited hangout might be overstating the agency’s capacity to hide new revelations.
4.3 Counterpoints: Why This May Not Be a Limited Hangout
Consistency With IC’s Acknowledged Uncertainty
The new assessment underscores that many details remain unknown, and that each agency weighs the same fragmentary evidence differently. The CIA’s stance might just reflect an evolving internal debate rather than a contrived partial admission.
No Bombshell Partial Disclosure
A typical limited hangout tactic often involves revealing something more dramatic or previously suppressed. The Barnes piece simply states the CIA “favors” a lab leak but still has “low confidence.” That’s arguably a mild pivot, not a significant new leak or unveiling of hidden proof.
Lack of Conclusive Evidence
The 2021 assessment strongly suggests the IC simply does not have a “smoking gun.” So if no explosive hidden intel exists, the CIA’s statement is less a “limited hangout” and more an honest (albeit inconclusive) shift in interpretation.
5. Updated Conclusion: Does the 2021 IC Assessment Strengthen or Weaken the “Limited Hangout” Argument?
Strengthens the Limited Hangout Argument
The Barnes article may be read as a public-facing partial admission that COVID-19 likely came from a lab, but with an emphasis on “no new evidence” and “low confidence.” This is consistent with a strategy of controlling the narrative: acknowledging a lab-leak possibility to placate external pressures while withholding any more specific or damning details.
The updated assessment shows the IC’s longstanding splits and notes that conclusive proof is absent—or possibly buried in Chinese labs. If the CIA truly discovered more incriminating information (e.g., internal WIV data), the Barnes piece can be viewed as a calibrated partial reveal that keeps deeper evidence off the table.
Weakens the Limited Hangout Argument
The 2021 IC report already reveals the same internal divisions, incomplete data, and no “smoking gun” evidence. The CIA’s stance in the Barnes article might simply reflect continued, inconclusive debate.
Stating “no new intelligence” is credible if the IC truly has not acquired fresh, decisive material since August 2021. In that case, the Barnes piece does not strongly indicate a cunning “partial disclosure,” but rather an acknowledgment of a real shift—albeit with modest confidence—within the same unsettled dataset.
6. Final Thoughts
Integrating the “Updated Assessment on COVID-19 Origins” gives important context:
On the one hand, the Barnes article could indeed represent a limited hangout:
It “admits” the CIA’s preference for a lab-leak explanation—in line with at least one IC element’s 2021 moderate confidence—while insisting there is no new intel.
This partial admission might satisfy public pressure without exposing any underlying classified data.
On the other, the updated assessment emphasizes the IC’s genuine lack of definitive evidence, with multiple agencies continuing to weigh the same fragmentary set of facts. Hence, the CIA’s new “low-confidence” endorsement of lab leak might be a sincere internal shift rather than a concerted disinformation strategy.
Ultimately, whether one sees the Barnes piece as a “limited hangout” hinges on the assumption that stronger proof exists but remains undisclosed. The August 2021 assessment suggests the intelligence community itself remains stuck with limited data, making it plausible that both the article and the new CIA stance simply mirror an ongoing, genuine inconclusive process—not a deliberate partial confession of something more damning. Still, from a more skeptical viewpoint, the updated assessment’s emphasis on obstruction and missing data provides space for suspicion that official statements are “admitting” the bare minimum while possibly leaving more revealing evidence under wraps.
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Edit February 2, 2025: “COVID-19 demonstrates a high affinity for binding to human cells because its FCS has the exact amino-acid-sequence identity to the FSC of human ENaCA. Is that true?”
*** The content below was generated by artificial intelligence using o3-mini-high search ***
No. The claim that SARS‑CoV‑2’s furin cleavage site (FCS) has an exact amino acid sequence match to that found in the human epithelial sodium channel (ENaC) and that this exact identity explains its high affinity for human cells is not supported by the scientific evidence.
Several detailed analyses have shown that although there is a superficial resemblance between a portion of the SARS‑CoV‑2 spike’s FCS and a similar motif in human ENaC (often cited as “RRARSVAS”), the sequences are not identical. For example, the SARS‑CoV‑2 FCS is created by a unique four–amino acid insertion (“PRRA”) at the S1/S2 boundary, producing a motif that is similar—but not the same as—that in ENaC. Importantly, studies comparing the nucleotide codons show that the codon usage for the SARS‑CoV‑2 FCS is distinct from that of human ENaC, suggesting the similarity is coincidental rather than evidence of direct copying or engineering. Moreover, the binding affinity of SARS‑CoV‑2 for human cells is determined by a complex interplay of many regions in the spike protein (such as the receptor-binding domain that engages ACE2), not solely by the FCS.
Thus, the high affinity of SARS‑CoV‑2 for human cells cannot be attributed to an exact sequence match with human ENaC. Its furin cleavage site appears to have arisen naturally and contributes to spike activation in a way that enhances infectivity, but it is not a mirror image of any human protein’s cleavage site.
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